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Should the constitutional right to procreative liberty extend to
assisted reproductive technologies? Unlike most commentators to
address this question, Radhika Rao appreciates that the answer
turns not only on constitutional values but also on the competence
of the institutions called upon to carry those values into effect. On
that basis, she urges courts to focus on reproductive equality rather
than recognizing a broad liberty right or leaving the regulation of
assisted reproductive technologies wholly to an unsupervised political
process. This brief symposium contribution assesses the institutional
promise and limitations of Rao's reproductive equality approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly forty years after Roe v. Wade,' a woman's constitutional
right to terminate her pregnancy remains intensely controversial. The
affirmative right to have children, by contrast, attracts relatively little
attention and even less controversy. Virtually no one thinks today's
t Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. For helpful comments on an
earlier draft, I thank Anuj Desai and Radhika Rao.
I 410 U.S. 113(1973).
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Supreme Court should (or would) permit population control measures
akin to China's one-child policy, much less the sort of mandatory
sterilization it upheld in Buck v. Bell during the heyday of American
eugenics. Rather, among ordinary citizens and constitutional lawyers
alike, there seems to be an unspoken consensus that Skinner v.
Oklahoma3 was right to describe procreative liberty as "one of the
basic civil rights of man."4
Behind this apparent consensus, however, lurks an important
ambiguity. Just how far does the procreative liberty protected by
the Constitution extend? Does it encompass a right to use noncoital
methods of reproduction like artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization? A right to select the sex-or even the genes--of
one's offspring using techniques such as flow cytometry5 and
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)?6 A right to pay for gametes
for use in any or all of these processes? Over the past fifteen years or
so, these questions have attracted increasing attention from scholars.
With rapid advances in the development of assisted reproductive
technologies, dramatic expansion in their use, and persistent calls for
more stringent regulation, courts will soon have little choice but to
follow suit.
How should they proceed? Commentators generally agree that the
Supreme Court's prior decisions neither compel nor preclude
extension of the constitutional right to procreative liberty beyond
coital reproduction.8 Attention has therefore focused on the normative
question: Should courts extend the right to procreative liberty to
2 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
4 Id. at 541.
s Flow cytometry uses a fluorescent dye to sort sperm by sex. All eggs carry a female sex
chromosome, so it is the sex chromosome of the fertilizing sperm that determines the sex of any
resulting child. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted
Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12 (2004).
6 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD, involves the biopsy and genetic or
chromosomal analysis of a single cell from an embryo created through in vitro fertilization,
allowing prospective parents to test for a range of genetic or chromosomal disorders. See Jaime
King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283, 290-91 (2008).
7 See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); Carter Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2007); King, supra note 6, at 326-29; Radhika Rao,
Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077
(1998); Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1514 (2008).
8 See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1457, 1462-68 (2008) [hereinafter Rao, Equal
Liberty] (acknowledging that procreative liberty decisions could be read as extending ARTs but
urging against it); Suter, supra note 7, at 1530-36 (same).
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assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)? If so, which ones, and in
what circumstances? Answers range widely but share one basic
feature in common: they confuse the question whether different forms
of procreative liberty are worthy of protection with the question
whether courts in particular should protect them. These are different
questions and will often have different answers, as I have argued at
length elsewhere.9
I shall not repeat those arguments here. Instead, in this brief
symposium contribution, I want to focus on one approach that does
not fall victim to such confusion-that of Radhika Rao. 0 Unlike most
other commentators in this area, Rao appreciates that normative
constitutional analysis must attend not only to goals and values but
also to the capacities of the institutions that carry (or attempt to carry)
those goals and values into effect. On this basis, among others, she
urges courts to focus on reproductive equality rather than recognizing
a broad liberty right or leaving the regulation of assisted reproductive
technology wholly to the political process. Only a reproductive
equality approach, she argues, is consistent with the judiciary's
special institutional role in the American system of government.11
For her sensitivity to institutional considerations, Rao deserves
credit. Her analysis of those considerations, however, leaves many
important questions unanswered. On one hand, she overlooks
important limitations of the judiciary that, given certain plausible
assumptions about the capacities of courts and legislatures, might
well recommend a rule of minimal constitutional protection over
Rao's reproductive equality approach. On the other hand, she glosses
over shortcomings of the political process that, given different but
equally plausible assumptions, might recommend a strong, judicially
enforced liberty right. Perhaps most important, she fails to carefully
compare the courts and the political process, generally focusing on
the flaws of one or the other in isolation. As a result, she overlooks
the possibility that a seriously flawed judiciary (or legislature) might
nevertheless be the best available option.
In the discussion that follows, I elaborate on the institutional
promise and limitations of Rao's reproductive equality approach.
Part I briefly summarizes that approach, situating it in the
relevant literature and highlighting its self-consciously institutional
foundations. Part II demonstrates the shakiness and incompleteness
of those foundations. I do not rule out the possibility that Rao's
See Andrew B. Coan, The Future of Reproductive Freedom (October 24, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1697347.
10 Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8.
1 See id. at 1459-60.
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approach might ultimately prove correct, but substantial additional
work would be required to support that conclusion persuasively.
In fairness to Rao, I should emphasize that her institutional
argument is only one part of a broader case for her reproductive
equality approach. She plainly did not set out to perform a complete
comparative institutional analysis, and I do not mean to criticize her
for failing at something she had no notion of attempting. On the other
hand, Rao quite explicitly presents institutional considerations as a
compelling reason for adopting her reproductive equality approach. It
seems both fair and important to point out how far short her argument
falls in this regard. In doing so, my principal object is not to criticize
Rao, whose work I admire, but to demonstrate how much more work
remains to be done.
A broader takeaway is that comparative institutional analysis is
both necessary to sound constitutional reasoning and more complex
than many otherwise able constitutional analysts have appreciated.12
This is hardly a new or an original point, but the problem remains
pervasive, which makes it worth revisiting periodically.
I. REPRODUCTIVE EQUALITY IN CONTEXT
Most discussion of procreative liberty and ARTs has focused on
substantive due process. In particular, the sharpest battle lines have
been drawn over the question whether freedom to use ARTs qualifies
as a fundamental liberty for purposes of due process analysis. There is
ample ambiguity in the Supreme Court's prior decisions to support
significant debate. Most basically, the Court has never addressed
the constitutionality of regulating ARTs. Indeed, it has squarely
addressed the due process right to procreate-as opposed to the right
not to procreate-only once, in the long since discredited Buck
v. Bell.13 Nevertheless, there is substantial dicta in the Court's
due process decisions extolling "the right of the individual . .. to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 4 And, of course, as noted earlier, Skinner v. Oklahoma
12 Rao is in excellent company here. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES (1994) (criticizing shallowness of institutional analysis among eminent
constitutional scholars, including John Hart Ely, Bruce Ackerman, and Richard Epstein);
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION (2006) (making a similar critique of William Eskridge and John Manning,
among others).
13 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (rejecting procedural and substantive due process
challenges to mandatory sterilization of the "feeble-minded").
14 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 565 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood
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memorably described procreation as "one of the basic civil rights of
man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."' 5
These statements would supply plausible precedential cover for the
Court to recognize a broad right to procreative liberty extending to all
manner of ARTs. But as most commentators have recognized, the
cases hardly compel such a result.16 Attention has therefore turned to
the normative question: Should the right to procreative liberty be
interpreted as encompassing the use of some or all ARTs? Answers
to this question have varied widely.' 7 Virtually all commentators,
however, have understood it as primarily a question about
constitutional values. Proponents of a broad right see the Court's prior
decisions as embodying an attractively broad vision of individual
autonomy over most or all reproductive decisions. They see no
reason constitutional protection should vary with the technology
involved.' 8 Opponents of a broad right, by contrast, trace the Court's
past decisions to some important constitutional value implicated by
abortion, contraception, and forced sterilization, but not the use of
ARTs. The most common examples are bodily integrity and sexual
equality.' 9
Radhika Rao takes a different approach. Though she is hardly
insensitive to the importance of constitutional values, she understands
that they are never the only factor in constitutional analysis.
Institutions matter, too. Indeed, any given value may be consistent
with multiple and radically different constitutional rules, depending
on the relative competence we attribute to courts and other relevant
decision-making institutions. Moreover, in some cases, consideration
of institutional competence may lead adherents of apparently
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992) (reaffirming this principle as stated in the
Roe).
1s 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (quoting
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
16 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 7, at 1530-36 (acknowledging that procreative liberty
decisions could be read as extending to ARTs); Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1462-64
(same).
17 Compare ROBERTSON, supra note 7 (arguing for a broad right that extends to most uses
of assisted reproductive technology), with Suter, supra note 7 (arguing for a narrower right of
"relational autonomy," limited by the effects of reproductive decisions on individuals, families,
and the community at large).
18 See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 421, 426 (1996).
'9 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v.
Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 856 (2007) ("Cloning and other genetic technologies are not
necessary to ameliorate women's inequalities with men, and indeed ... one can easily imagine
how these technologies might someday be used to undermine women's equality."); Suter, supra
note 7, at 1545 ("Because IVF and [PGD] disembody reproduction, it is difficult to protect these
technologies under such a theory of reproductive rights.").
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competing values to converge on a single constitutional rule, despite
their normative disagreements.2 0
Drawing on these basic but frequently overlooked insights, Rao
rejects a broad due process right to use ARTs. But she also rejects
the other extreme, a rule of no (or minimal) constitutional protection.
Instead, her reproductive equality approach would generally permit
ART regulation aimed at particular technologies, techniques, and
even purposes, but would not permit regulation that discriminates on
the basis of status or group membership.2 1 She would, for example,
permit state or national legislatures to ban a technique like PGD
altogether.2 2 She would also permit them to ban the use of any ART
for the purpose of sex selection.23 She would not, however, permit
regulations limiting the use of PGD or in vitro fertilization (IVF) to
married or heterosexual couples. Under her approach, such a ban
would unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of status.24
There is only one form of status distinction Rao would not subject
to heightened scrutiny: regulations that afford infertile persons
greater access to ARTs. The example she offers is Italy's Law 40,
which restricts ART access to infertile couples.2 5 Her rationale for
permitting such regulations is similar to that frequently offered to
support affirmative action (or reasonable accommodations for the
disabled). Not all status distinctions are created equal. When such
distinctions reflect a benevolent effort to level the playing field, rather
than a lack of equal respect, they are not constitutionally problematic,
as Rao sees it.
Rao's defense of this approach is based in part on her substantive
commitment to equality and in part on her interpretive judgment
that equality is a constitutionally significant value. Nevertheless, at
nearly every stage, her argument draws heavily on institutional
considerations. A broad liberty right, she contends, would require
20 See Coan, supra note 9 (discussing these points at length in the context of ARTs and
procreative liberty); see also Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 889 (2003) ("[I]nstitutional analysis may ... allow interpreters who
hold different commitments to converge on particular interpretive rules while bracketing
disagreements about their preferred first-best accounts.").
21 See Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1459-60.
22 See id. at 1481-82.
23 See id. at 1483.
24 More precisely, it would be a constitutionally suspect discrimination on the basis of
status, subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Rao does not believe that distinctions based on
marital status or sexual orientation could survive such scrutiny, but she hints that the right sort
of age-based distinction might. See id. at 1475-78.
25 Law 40/2004 of Feb. 19, 2004, 2004 Gazz. Uff. No. 45 (Feb. 24, 2004); see Rao, Equal
Liberty, supra note 8, at 1458-59. There are other aspects of Law 40 Rao would view as
unconstitutional if they were enacted in the United States. Most notable is its restriction of ART
use to "stable" heterosexual couples. Id. at 1476-78.
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courts to make too many policy judgments better left to political
decision-makers.26 Minimal rational basis review, on the other
hand, would leave politically powerless groups subject to the unjust
and unequal depredations of the powerful.27 A chief selling point of
Rao's reproductive equality approach is that it avoids both horns of
this dilemma. When the political process can most be trusted, Rao
counsels deference. When it cannot, she counsels close judicial
supervision. The argument is quintessentially institutional.
II. INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHTS
In a field where institutional issues have received virtually no
attention, Rao deserves credit for recognizing their importance.
Unfortunately, she seems not to appreciate their complexity. In
particular, she fails to recognize the significant demands her
reproductive equality approach would place on an imperfect judiciary.
She also overlooks serious limitations of the political process. Most
fundamentally, she never seriously compares the competence of the
judiciary and the political process with respect to ART regulation.
A. Imperfect Courts
Rao recognizes that the judiciary is an imperfect institution.
Indeed, that is her primary argument for opposing a broad
constitutional right to use ARTs. For some reason, however, she
loses sight of this fact in considering the merits of her own
reproductive equality approach. Among other difficult tasks, that
approach would require courts to distinguish regulations targeting
conduct from those targeting status-a notoriously tricky matter. It
would also require courts to determine when, if ever, group
status justifies differential regulatory treatment. Finally, it would
require courts to distinguish invidious status discrimination from
benevolently motivated status accommodations, which Rao would
not subject to heightened scrutiny. In each of these tasks it seems
obvious that courts would make mistakes.
Let us take them one by one. It is a core tenet of the reproductive
equality approach that regulations of ART targeting conduct are
distinct from those targeting status. For present purposes, we can
assume that this distinction exists in principle.28 The important point
26 Id. at 1461.
27 Id. at 1475.
28 In fact, its metaphysics are complicated and contested in ways that Rao fails to grapple
with. Cf Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. CoLO. L. REV. 429, 445 (1997) (describing
the "amplitude of conceptual relationships between status and conduct" in the context of sexual
11492010]
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for institutional analysis is that it is difficult to apply in practice.
Consider the following examples: (1) a statute banning the use of
ARTs by persons taking anti-depressants or anti-psychotics; (2) a
statute requiring ART users to demonstrate the financial means to
care for a child; (3) a statute banning ART altogether. Any one of
these could be plausibly characterized as a regulation targeting
conduct (use of particular drugs, conceiving a child one is unable
to support, use of ART) or a status-based discrimination (against
the mentally ill, the poor, the infertile). Even assuming that one
characterization is uniquely correct in each case, courts are
exceedingly unlikely to get it right every time. Just how unlikely is,
of course, an empirical question. But it is a question Rao never asks.
That is only the beginning. Once a court identifies a regulation
as status-based discrimination, Rao's reproductive equality approach
requires it to consider whether the regulation is nevertheless justified
by an important state interest.29 Consider the following possibilities:
(1) a statute restricting ART use to couples in stable long-term
relationships; (2) a statute banning ART use by the mentally ill; (3) a
statute banning ART use by persons with prior convictions for
physical or sexual abuse of a child. Each of these hypothetical statutes
is at least plausibly connected to the state's indisputably important
interest in cAild welfare. But whether that connection is strong enough
in any given case turns on complex judgments of fact and value of the
sort courts are bound to get wrong some of the time. Indeed, Rao
cites judicial fallibility (and lack of legitimacy) in such matters as an
important reason for rejecting a broad liberty right to use ART. Just
how significant this problem will be in the narrower class of cases
implicating reproductive equality is a difficult empirical question. But
again, it is one that Rao fails to ask.
Finally, Rao's approach requires courts to distinguish between
invidious status-based discrimination and benevolently motivated
status accommodations. In the affirmative action context, of course,
the distinction between benign and malign status distinctions
has proven politically explosive. It has also, according to at least
some judges, proven difficult to apply in practice. 30 Both of these
orientation).
2 See, e.g., Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1475-78 (recognizing age-based
classifications as potentially valid in light of the governmental interest in children being born to
living parents able to provide adequate care for them).
3 Perhaps the most famous expression of this view is City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Absent searching judicial inquiry ... there is
simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
1150 [Vol. 60:4
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complications would almost certainly be less serious in the context
of ART regulation, where there is only one logical candidate for
accommodation-the infertile-and no long history of social conflict
pitting that group against others. Still, real difficulties might emerge.
Consider the following examples: (1) a health insurance regulation
mandating subsidized coverage of IVF but prohibiting such coverage
of contraceptives; (2) a statute limiting ART use, including PGD use
for medical and genetic enhancement purposes, to the infertile.3 1 Both
of these could plausibly be characterized as remedying an arbitrary
disadvantage suffered by the infertile or as granting them a special
privilege not enjoyed by persons capable of coital reproduction.
Whatever the correct answer, courts are unlikely to arrive at it every
time.
The point is not that courts should stay out of the reproductive
equality business. It is that we cannot know whether they should do
so without a much more rigorous institutional analysis than Rao has
to offer. Such an analysis could cut in any number of directions.
For example, if courts applying the reproductive equality approach
would mistakenly uphold too many discriminatory regulations, they
might do better by enforcing a broad liberty right to use ARTs.32
Conversely, if the reproductive equality approach would mistakenly
invalidate too many nondiscriminatory regulations (or justified
status-based regulations), courts might do better by subjecting all
ART regulations to minimal rational basis review. Of course, both of
these approaches would produce their own share of mistakes, which
might well be more serious than the mistakes courts would make
politics."); see also Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 778 n.27 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It is no answer to say that these cases can be
distinguished from Brown because Brown involved invidious racial classifications whereas the
racial classifications here are benign. How does one tell when a racial classification is
invidious?" (citation omitted)); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality
of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 24 ("The exception [for
benign racial classifications] is inadmissible, because it requires the court not only to consider
whether there is discrimination but to decide whether the discrimination harms or hurts a
particular racial group, and to weigh the competing claims of different racial groups, and the
additional inquiries rob the principle of its precision and objectivity."). But see Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n.12 (1990) ("We are confident that 'an
examination of the legislative scheme and its history' will separate benign measures from other
types of racial classifications." (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16
(1975) (citation omitted)).
31 PGD, recall, allows parents to select embryos for implantation on the basis of their
genetic make-up. Obviously, that option is unavailable to couples that reproduce coitally.
32 Rao alludes to this possibility in passing at the very end of her article, but says it would
be justified only if the political process is more deviously discriminatory than she believes it to
be. See Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1487. She fails to recognize that it might also be
justified as a response to judicial fallibility.
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applying Rao's approach. She has offered no compelling reason,
however, to believe that this is the most likely scenario.
B. Imperfect Politics
Rao's analysis of the political process suffers from similar
problems. As with the judiciary, she understands that the political
process is imperfect. Indeed, political malfunction is a primary
justification for her reproductive equality approach. But somehow
she forgets this fact when it comes to conduct-based (as opposed to
status-based) regulation of ARTs. Assisted reproduction, she states
flatly, "does not involve the interests of a group that lacks political
power."3 3 This is unsatisfactory on a number of levels.
To begin with, political power, like political malfunction, is
relative. It is true that prospective ART users are, on average,
financially better off than most other voters. They can also probably
count on the political support of the booming fertility industry. And
unlike many other groups for which the Court has shown special
constitutional solicitude, ART users do not suffer from any significant
historically entrenched disadvantage or stigma. Still, as a group, these
users are numerically tiny, especially for the more specialized ARTs
like PGD, which seem more likely to be strictly regulated than IVF.34
At any given time, moreover, many members of this group will be
unaware of the conditions-infertility or serious heritable diseases-
that might eventually make ART attractive to them. For all of these
reasons, prospective ART users are almost certainly substantially less
powerful than many groups that Rao would grant special judicial
protection-notably, women and racial minorities.
Perhaps more important, prospective ART users face a powerful
organized opposition in the religious right and allied pro-life groups. 35
This is especially true in the Deep South, where regulations that
would sharply curtail IVF and functionally prohibit PGD have already
received serious consideration at the state level.36 As technology
advances, permitting PGD to be used for a broader range of traits and
perhaps rendering human reproductive cloning safe and effective, the
33 Id. at 1478.
34 Cf Coan, supra note 9, at 128 n.103 (noting greater likelihood of regulation curtailing
human cloning and genetic enhancement applications of PGD as compared with PGD used for
medical purposes).
35 Many such groups object to some or all ARTs on the grounds that they require the
destruction of embryos and amount to "playing God" with the human reproductive process. See,
e.g., King, supra note 6, at 319 (discussing these objections).
36 See Posting of William Saletan, Human Nature: The IVF Battlefield, http://www.slate




conditions for majoritarian bias against users of these ARTs are
likely to become increasingly ripe. Indeed, public opposition to
reproductive cloning and genetic enhancement applications of
PGD already appears to be far higher than opposition to abortion at
any time since Roe v. Wade and also higher than contemporaneous
opposition to Brown v. Board of Education.38 In such an environment,
it is far from clear that the interests of ART users will receive
appropriate consideration.
Rao makes two other points about the reliability of the political
process in the context of ART regulation. Both are problematic.
The first is a casual assertion that legislatures are the appropriate
institution to resolve controversial policy disputes.39 Rao is not
entirely clear about the basis for this. But to the extent it
is distinguishable from her subsequent invocation of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, it seems likely to rest on the commonly
presumed superiority of legislative fact-finding. That presumption
is hardly baseless. Legislatures do have formidable fact-finding
capacities. But as Douglas Laycock points out, that does not mean
they actually engage in serious factual investigations.4 0 Indeed, their
electoral accountability often leads them to accord significant weight
to public views that are deeply ignorant and analytically confused.4 '
The problem seems likely to be especially pronounced with respect to
emerging technologies like ART, which are not only new and
complex but also the subject of far-fetched science-fiction scenarios
that seem to have greatly warped public views.42
3 See Coan, supra note 9, at 143-44 (elaborating the reasons for this).
38 Compare Matthew C. Nisbet, Public Opinion About Stem Cell Research and Human
Cloning, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 131, 150-51 (2004) (reporting consistent and robust opposition to
most uses of human reproductive cloning), and Kathy L. Hudson, Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis: Public Policy and Public Attitudes, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1638, 1641
(2006) (reporting 72% opposition to use of PGD for nonmedical traits), with Samantha Luks
& Michael Salamone, Abortion, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 80,
90 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds. 2008) (documenting at least plurality support for Roe v. Wade
since 1974), and Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY, supra, at 18, 21 (documenting slim but solid majority support for Brown v.
Board of Education in months following decision).
3 See Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1461 (defending reproductive equality
approach "because it does not call upon courts to make controversial choices as to which acts
are worthy of constitutional protection").
4 See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1174-75 (2007)
("Legislators can do serious investigations, but they rarely do.... They face constant
fundraising, constituent service, importuning by lobbyists, political posturing and spin control,
and thousands of bills in every session on every conceivable topic. They cannot possibly
become expert on more than a few of those bills.").
4' See generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS
KNow ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996) (describing widespread public
ignorance).
42 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987,
2010] 1153
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Rao's second point is a similarly casual invocation of the
countermajoritarian difficulty. Her implicit premise here is that any
judicial invalidation of ART regulation must be against the wishes of
a majority of the public. This view ignores a voluminous literature
suggesting that the political process is frequently more responsive to
well-organized minorities than it is to diffuse majorities.4 3 Thus, even
if ART users are able to muster majority support (as they have done
on some issues)," there is no guarantee that support will protect them
against burdensome regulation. Rao also ignores a complementary
body of literature arguing that courts are frequently more in tune with
national public opinion than legislatures, at least at the state level.45
Finally, she ignores the complication that, on most policy issues of
any complexity, a majority of the public has no well-formed view for
courts to thwart (where well-formed is defined as internally coherent,
consistent over time, and not easily susceptible to manipulation by
question framing)."
Again, the point is not that Rao is wrong in rejecting a broad
liberty right to use ART. It is that we cannot know whether she is
wrong or right without a much more rigorous institutional analysis
than Rao supplies. Here, too, such an analysis could cut in any
number of directions. The political process might mishandle ART
regulation so badly that courts would do best by enforcing a broad
liberty right. On the other hand, courts enforcing such a right-or
Rao's narrower reproductive equality approach-might do even
worse than the badly flawed political process.47 In that case, minimal
rational basis review would be the most sensible course. Finally, Rao
could be right that courts will do better than legislatures if and only
if they restrict their attention to status-based discrimination. The
996, 1005 (2002) (discussing scientific misconceptions that appear to underlie public unease
about reproductive cloning); see also Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of
Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 647,658-77 (2000) (same).
43 This, of course, is a core tenet of public choice theory, on which the classic statement is
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGT. Sa. 3 (1971). But
see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTS (2008) (vigorously critiquing
public choice theory as comprehensive account of administrative agency behavior).
44 See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 38, at 1641 (reporting 68% support for PGD to select
embryos free from fatal childhood disease).
45 See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, The Countermajoritarian Classics (and an Upside Down
Theory of Judicial Review) (August 31, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669560.
See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009).
46 See, e.g., James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen
Competence, 23 POL. BEHAV. 225 (2001); Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder, Issue
Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 1055 (1996).
47 This is true whether "better" and "worse" are defined by the relative quality of
fact-finding or relative consistency with majority preferences.
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evidence she has offered, however, is far from sufficient to prove her
case.
C. Imperfect Analysis
The foregoing discussion boils down to this: at too many points,
Rao is too content to rest her argument on timeworn institutional
folklore. In a world of complex policy problems and complex
institutions, this approach is insufficient to support meaningful
conclusions. An even more fundamental problem is Rao's failure to
seriously compare the capacities of different institutions. This point
is implicit in the previous sections, but it is sufficiently important
and sufficiently reflective of broader tendencies in constitutional
analysis to merit a few additional words here.
The basic point is simply expressed. Intelligent institutional choice
requires a comparison of the plausible institutional alternatives. It is
never enough to show that one institution functions well or poorly in
the abstract. What matters is whether it functions better or worse
than other institutions that might be called upon to decide the issue
in question. So stated, the point seems glaringly obvious. But it is
one that many eminent constitutional analysts have overlooked. That
group includes John Hart Ely, the main inspiration for Rao's
"representation-reinforcement" approach to reproductive liberty.48
Rao makes the same mistake. Where ART regulation discriminates
on the basis of group status, she treats the untrustworthiness of the
political process as a conclusive argument in favor of aggressive
judicial review. Where ART regulation does not so discriminate, she
treats the judiciary's lack of accountability as a conclusive argument
in favor of leaving the issue to a basically unsupervised political
process. In neither case does she consider the possibility that the
alternative may be even worse.
As we have already seen, that possibility is very real. Even if
political judgments are less trustworthy when legislators exempt
themselves from the sting of their own laws,49 courts might
overestimate the extent of this problem, leading them to strike
down well-justified regulations. Even if they appraise the problem
accurately, they might still reach less reliable conclusions than a
48 See KOMESAR, supra note 12, at 197 (noting that Ely "define[s] the role of the judiciary
in terms of the performance of the political process without parallel comparison with the
judiciary itself'); Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1461 (describing her approach as
"grounded in a process-based perspective reminiscent of John Hart Ely's").
49 See Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 8, at 1488 ("Equal liberty preserves fundamental
freedoms by ensuring that legislators deprive themselves of the same rights they would deny to
others.").
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biased legislature, however reliability is defined. The opposite,
however, is equally true. Even though courts are not electorally
accountable, legislatures might be even more countermajoritarian (in
particular contexts) or even worse at making controversial policy
judgments (because the public views they respond to are ignorant or
incoherent).
The problem is even more serious than it appears at first blush. It
is not merely that comparison is an analytic necessity and that all
institutions are highly imperfect. It is also that institutions tend to
move together. When legislatures are at their worst, courts will tend
to be also, and vice versa. There are differences, of course, or
institutional choice would be of no consequence. Occasionally, these
differences are very substantial. In general, however, the major
decision-making institutions in American society are driven by
similar dynamics of participation. They therefore tend to malfunction
50
at the same times and for the same reasons.
The upshot is that a "single-institutional"51 analysis like Rao's
cannot function usefully even as a rough-and-ready shortcut. If the
judiciary or the political process is flawed, the odds are that any
substitute institution will also be flawed and for similar reasons. It
may be less seriously flawed, in which case substitution will make
sense. But one can reach that conclusion only through serious
comparison of all the relevant alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional law of procreative liberty is about to enter a new
era. Past experience provides no firm guide as to how or even in
which direction courts should proceed. Many academic commentators
have attempted to chart a course forward, but virtually all have
understood the task as primarily a matter of constitutional values.
Only Radhika Rao has meaningfully recognized the importance of
institutional considerations. As we have seen, however, her analysis
leaves much work to be done. 52 The limitations of Rao's approach
provide an opportunity to reflect on the state of institutional analysis
5 This is a central insight of Neil Komesar's participation-centered approach to
institutional analysis. See KOMESAR, supra note 12, at 27 ("The same factors that cause one
alternative institution to vary often affect all the alternative institutions. Changes in numbers,
per capita stakes, and the costs of participation ... cause the ability of all the major institutions
to vary, often in the same direction."). For an application of this approach to ART regulation,
see Coan, supra note 9, at 136-49.
5' I borrow this term from Komesar. See KOMESAR, supra note 12, at 6 (defining "single
institutionalism" as "the focus on only one institution").
52 For a fuller account of the magnitude of this challenge, see Coan, supra note 9.
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more generally. Among constitutional scholars, Rao is by no means
alone in her reliance on crudely incomplete institutional stereotypes.
Nor is the single-institutional character of her approach out of the
ordinary. We can and must do better. The future of reproductive
equality, among other things, depends upon it.

